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Recent Case Law on

Maryland's Speedy Trial Rule
by Mary Comeau

In 1979, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the application of Maryland
Rule 746, now Maryland Rule 4-271, is
mandatory and that the sanction for failure to comply with this l8O-day rule is
dismissal of the charges with prejudice. 1
Since that time, there has been a plethora
of litigation concerning the interpretation of the Rule and the applicability of
the dismissal sanction?
Maryland Rule 4-271 requires that, in
circuit court, a trial date must be set
within thirty days after either the appearance of counsel or the fIrst appearance
of the defendant before the circuit court,
whichever occurs fIrst. 3 This trial date
shall not be later than 1~ days after the
earlier of these events. If a postponement causes the trial to be held after 180
days has passed, the postponement is in
accordance with the rule only if a party
or the court sua sponte requests the
postponement, good cause is shown by
the moving party, and the county administrative judge or his or her designee
approves the postponement of the trial. 5
The purpose of Rule 4-271 is to promote orderly procedure by setting a time
limit for the State to prepare for trial. 6
The Rule seeks to minimize the societal
effects of excessive delays in the criminal
justice system? It does not implement
the accused's sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. 8
Sixth amendment case analysis differs
signifIcantly from the analysis applicable
to Rule 4-271. The Maryland Rule is analyzed under principles of statutory construction. 9 Sixth amendment speedy trial
cases are analyzed under the four factor
balancing test announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo. 10 These four factors are: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the
delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the
right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant
because ofthe delay. 11
Once a case is properly postponed
beyond the Rule's l8O-day limit, a
defendant's right to a speedy trial is protected only by the sixth amendment. 12

Even if a case is properly postponed
under Rule 4-271, however, a prosecutor
must remain diligent in bringing a defendant to trial at the earliest possible date.
InReedv. State, 13 for example, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
while a postponement beyond the 18(}
day period had been properly granted,
and thus the dismissal sanction under the
Rule was not appropriate, a delay of more
than thirteen months between the
defendant's arrest and trial violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. His
conviction was reversed, therefore, even
though Rule 4-271 had not been violated.

l8O-day period began on the date the
preliminary hearing was scheduled, Rule
4-271 was violated and the charges
would be dismissed. 21 The court of special appeals held to the contrary. The
18O-day period begins when counsel enters an appearance or the defendant fIrst
appears before the circuit court. In this
case, because no preliminary hearing
was ever conducted, counsel's ~pear
ance started the l8O-day clock. The
court stated that it was irrelevant that the
State, by its negligence, may have caused
the preliminary hearing to be postponed. 23

In Grandison v. State,24 the court of
appeals held that when a case is removed
at the defendant's request, the 18O-day
period begins to run anew in the receiving court from the time the case is received. 25 In this case, the defendant
requested that the case be removed to
the Circuit Court for Somerset County
less than one month before the 18O-day
period expired in ~e Circuit Court for
Baltimore County. 2 The court of appeals
noted that the major safeguard of Rule
4-271 is that a case may only be postponed by an administrative judge or his
or her designee, as such persons have an
overall view of the court's business?7
The court concluded that the Rule was
not designed to cover situations of removal because the administrative judge
of the court from which the case was
removed would be unable to fulfill the
functions contemplated by the Rule. 28
Moreover, to require the receiving court
to adhere to the trial schedule set by the
forwarding court would impose an unreasonable and often impossible task
upon the administrative judge of the receiving court. 29 The court held, therefore, that when a case is removed at the
defendant's request, the trial date set in
the original court in accordance with
Rule 4-271 is no longer relevant and the
l8O-day period begins anew in the receiving court. 30 Additionally, the court stated
in dictum that the same principle applies
if removal is granted at the request of the
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 0 . 3 (The Law Forum-II

Running of the ISO-day Clock
The l8O-day period begins at the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the
fIrst appearance of the defendant before
the circuit court. 14 The l8O-day period,
however, does not apply to cases
brought in the district court. 15 Thus,
when a defendant is fIrst charged in the
district court but later indicted in the
circuit court, the time spent in the district couf is not included in the l8O-day
period. 1 Moreover, if a case is transferred from the district court because of
a demand for jury trial, and the appearance of counsel was entered in the district court, the l8O-day period begins on
the date the case was docketed in the
circuit court. 17
Although the Rule seems to be clear
regarding when the 180-day period begins, there have been a number of
cases that have litigated this issue. In
McCallum v. State,18 the defendant
was convicted of various violations of
the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code. A preliminary hearing was
scheduled for March 28, 1988. At that
time, the defendant was serving a six
month sentence in the Anne Arundel
County Detention Center and, for reasons not explained, the defendant was
not transported to the hearing. 19 The
hearing was postponed and no further
action was taken until counsel entered
his appearance on May 6, 1988.20 If the

StateY If it appears, however, that the
State's request was for the purpose of, or
had the necessary effect of, circumventing the Rule, the original trial date will
control for purposes of Rule 4-271.3 2
The Grandison holding is consistent
with the ruling of the court of appeals in
Curly v. State. 33 In that case, the court
held that when a criminal case in the
circuit court is nol prossed and the State
later reflies the same charges, the 18().day
period begins with the arraignment or
first appearance of counsel in the second
prosecution. 34 If it is shown, however,
that the nol pros had the purpose or
effect of circumventing the Rule, the 180day period begins with the arraignment
or first appearance of counsel in the first
prosecution. 35

defendant failed to appear for the scheduled trial date because the District of
Columbia was holding him on other
charges, and refused to honor the
county's writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 43 The court, unable to proceed with the trial, ordered the clerk to
"show [the case] out of assignment.,,44
Six days before the expiration of the
l8O-day period, the State requested, in
writing, that the clerk set a new date for
motions and trial. 45 The assignment office set the trial date for three months
afterJre expiration of the l8O-day period. The State never sought a postponement by the administrative judge or
his or her designee during the 18().day
period. 47 The trial court dismissed the
charges because no judge approved the
postl?onement beyond the 18O-day period,1I8 and the court of special appeals
affirmed because of the State's failure
comply with the Rule's reqUirements. 9
Moreover, the court of special appeals
recently held that a designee of an administrative judge may not further deSignate
another judge as havin§ the authority to
grant postponements. 5 The court noted
that the purpose of requiring an administrative judge or his or her designee to
make the good cause determination is to
ensure that the decision is made by the
person in the best position to do so.51
The court, therefore, concluded that in
light of this purpose and the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 4-271, the
Rule contemplates but one designation
for gurposes of a change in the trial
date. 52

need not personally reset or cause the
case to be reset for a particular date but
may delegate this responsibility to the
assignment office. 55 It must be remembered, however, that once a postponement has been granted for good cause,
the administrative judge and the prosecutor are administratively responsible for
ensuring that the postponement is not
extended in violation of the sixth amendment. 56
In the past, Maryland courts have identified a number of situations that qualify
as good cause, many of which involve
pretrial preparations or motions. 57 For
example, a delay in receiving an evaluation concerning the defendant's mental
health58 or a determination that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial may
constitute good cause. 59 Additionally,
good cause may be found when a motion
for severance is granted when only one
defendant can be tried on schedule and
when time is taken up on a pretrial suppression motion. 60 Moreover, when the
parties are involved in bona fide plea
bargaining, or if the defendant fails to
comply with a valid discovery request,
good cause may exist for a postponement on behalf of the State. 61 Good cause
may ~so exist if new evidence is discovered. 2 Furthermore,
although a
defendant's need to secure counsel may
constitute good cause, a defendant's last
minute request to change counsel, or a
defendant's claim that appointed counsel was unprepared, does not constitute
good cause. 63
Maryland courts have also ruled that an
excusable failure to secure the attendance of a ~y witness may constitute
good cause. Whether such a failure
constitutes g~od cause is analyzed under
four criteria. 5 These criteria are: (1) the
reasonable expectation of securing the
witness within a reasonable time; (2) the
competency and materiality of the proffered witness; (3) the ability to try the
case fairly without the witness; and (4)
the exercise of reasonable diligence by
the party requesting the postponement
to se~re the witness prior to the trial
date.
Furthermore, the court of special appeals has held that when a defendant
backs out of a plea agreement on the day
of trial and demands a jury trial, good
cause exists for a postponement on behalf of the State to summon witnesses
and to ~therwise prepare for a trial on the
merits. 7 The court has also decided that
the denial of a request for a postponement by a defendant, whose mother was
in a coma and was not expected to live,
was not an abuse of discretion. 68 Thus, a
defendant's need to visit a sick relative
may not cogstitute good cause to postpone a trial. 9
The court of appeals has held that
non-chronic court congestion may con-

The Role of the Adntinistrative
Judge
Maryland courts have consistently
held that every postponement must be
granted by an admJnistrative judge or his
or her designee. 3 The intervention of
the administrative judge is critical because
'it is the administrative judge who
has an overall view of the court's
business, who is responsible "for
the administration of the court,"
who assigns trial judges, who "supervise[s] the assignment of actions
for trial," who supervises th<; court
personnel involved in the assignment of cases, and who receives
reports from such personnel,' and
'[c]onsequently the administrative
judge is ordinarily in a much better
position than another judge of the
trial court, or an appellate court, to
make the judgment as to whether
good cause for the pos~onement of
a criminal case exists.'
Accordingly, the court of appeals has
held that any procedure by which all
trial judges are purportedly designees of
the administrative judge, and thus authorized to grant postponementsg
would not comply with Rule 4-271. 3
Similarly, the court has held that a trial
n
judge may not grant a postponement
beyond the 180-day limit, subject to the
approval of the administrative judge,
when such approval takes place after
the expiration date. 39
The Good Cause Requirement
More recently, the court of appeals has
held that the circuit court's assignment
A fair reading of Rule 4-271 and the
officer may not grant a postponement
cases dictate that the party requesting a
that places ~e trial date beyond the 180postponement beyond the l8O-day peday period. 0 The court stated that Rule
riod, whether the party is the court, the
4-271 does not "contemplate or permit
State, or the defendant, must show good
the exercise of postponement authority
cause. 53 The court of appeals has ruled,
by anyone other than one with the auhowever, that an administrative judge's
thority of an administrative judge. ,,41
decision to postpone a case for good
Similarly, in State v. Robertson,42 the
cause need not specifically acknowledge
court of special appeals held that the
that the postponement will caN the
requirements of Rule 4-271 are not satiscase beyond the 18O-day period. 5 Morefied when the trial court orders a case
over, once a case is properly postponed
"out of assignment." In that case, the
for good cause, the administrative judge
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requesting a
postponement ...
must show good
cause.

stitute good cause but chronic court congestion is inexcusable.1O It has been suggested that the State and the hearing
judge present as much evidence as possible with regard to the request for a
postponement, including live witnesses
and court records, to show the efforts
being made by the court and the State's
Anomey's Office to comp-Ir with the requirements of Rule 4-271.1
Similarly, in State v. Toney,n the court
of appeals held that the unavailability of
a prosecutor may constitute good cause
to warrant postponement under the
Speedy Trial Rule when the prosecutor's
scheduling conflicts are caused by unusual situations. 73 The defendant was
charged with ftrst and second degree
murder and related weapons violations.14 The case was postponed several
times for various reasons, including the
unavailability of a courtroom, the late
receipt of evidence, and the unavailability of a judge.15 The fourth and critical
postponement was granted because the
prosecuto~ was trying an unrelated murder case? The prosecutor argued that
he had developed a rapport with a key
witness and such rapport was not easily
transferable to another prosecutor.77
The administrative judge found good
cause for the postponement.1S When the
case was called for trial, and a different
anomey represented the State, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the
ground that the good cause requirement
of Rule 4-271 had not been satisfied?9
The defendant's motion was denied. so
The appellate court noted that the determination as to what constitutes good
cause is a matter within the discretion of
the administrative judge,Sl and his determination of good cause will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse
of discretion or a lack of good cause as a
matter of law.s2 The court found no evidence that prosecutors are habitually unavailable due to trial conflicts and thus
determined that the administrative judge
could have properly concluded that
good cause existed for a postponement. S3
In Wright v. State,84 the defendant's
trial date was inadvertentlx set for a date
in violation of Rule 4-271.s The prosecutor discovered the violation three days
before the l8O-day period expired and
requested that the administrativeJudge
reset the trial for the 180th day. The
defendant's counsel objected, stating
that the defendant was not present and
had not been served to appear. S7 The
administrative judge moved the trial date
forward and placed the burden of notifying the defendant on his counsel and his
bondsman. 88 The defendant failed to appear on the new trial date and the administrative judge found good cause to
postpone the trial date to the original trial
date outside ofthe l8O-day period.S9 On

that trial date, the defendant moved to
dismiss for failure to comply with Rule
4-271. 90 The trial judge denied the motion. 91 The appellate court noted that the
State had made a good faith effort to set
the trial in accordance with Rule 4-271
and to notify the defendant of the change
in the trial date. 92 The court determined
that appellant's failure to appear was not
caused by any bad faith on the part of the
State. 93 Accordingly, the court concluded that there was good cause for
postponement. 94

((Ordinarily, the
appropriate
sanction for a
violation of the.
Rule is dismissal
with prejudice. n
Sanction fOt" Noncompliance
Ordinarily, the appropriate sanction
for a violation of the Speedy Trial Rule is
dismissal with prejudice. 95 The court of
appeals has consistently held that the
postponement that carries the case beyond the 18O-day period is the critical
one. 96 The dismissal sanction is not appropriate, however, if the violation of
Rule 4-271 is a failure to set the trial date
within thirty days of the earlier of either
the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the
circuit court. 97 Additionally, dismissal is
inappropriate when the defendant seeks
or expressly consents to a trial date in
violation of Rule 4-271.9S

A defendant'S motion for an extension
of time to file an election of a court or
jury trial, for example, was held to
amount to seeking or expressly consenting to a trial date in violation of the Rule. 99
Even if defense counsel's consent to a
trial date beyond the l8O-day period is
inadvertent, the dismissal sanction is not
warranted. lOO Moreover, even though a
defendant's request or acquiescence in a
postponement is not automatically considered seeking or consenting to a postponement in violation of the Rule, such
action in the latter portion of the l8O-day
period may be considered consent. lOl A
defendant's insistence on his sixth
amendment right to counsel on the day
of trial, however, does not constitute
consent. l02 However, once a defendant
agrees to a plea bargain, there is a de facto
"waiver" of the Rule's prompt trial provisions. l03

In State v. Brown,104 the court of appeals reaffirmed its previous holding that
when a defendant expressly and unqualiftedly consents to a trial date in violation
of Rule 4-271, dismissal is an inappropriate sanction. In Brown, the defendant
ftled a document purporting to "waive"
the requirements of the Rule. 105 The
court noted that the Rule's requirements
may not be waived because the Rule does
not codify a defendant's right to a speedy
trial; rather, it is designed to further
society's interest in theoJ'rompt disposition of criminal trials. 1 The Rule's requirements, therefore, are binding on
both the prosecution and the defense. l07
The court concluded, however, that
when a defendant seeks or expressly
consents to a date in violation of the Rule,
as the defendant did in this case, dismissal is not appropriate because the
defendant would gain an advantage by
his own violation of the Rule. lOS
Moreover, in Treece v. State/ 09 the
court of special appeals held that when
defense counsel enters an insanity plea
over the objection of the defendant, and
the critical postponement is premised on
a joint request for mental examination,
the defendant has sought or expressly
consented to a trial date in violation of
Rule 4-271. The court concluded that,
because the decision of defense counsel
to enter an insanity plea was amply supported, the subsequent postponement to
conduct psychiatric examinations was
not in violation of the Rule. 110

Review of Violations of Rule 4-271
Denial of a motion to dismiss for a
violation of Rule 4-271 may be appealed
only after a final judgment. III When a
motion to dismiss is granted, however,
the State may appeal immediateIyY2 A
defendant need not raise the denial of the
motion at trial in order to preserve it for
review if he has ftled a motion to dismiss
for a violation of Rule 4-271 and a hearing
has been heldY3 The court of appeals
has held that when a defendant diligently
pursues a prompt trial, there can be no
waiver of the issue merely because the
hearing judge, who was also the trial
judge, failed to put his denial of the motion on the record. 114 Because a trial
judge has a duty to rule on all pretrial
motions, when the matter proceeds to
trial it can be concluded that the judge
denied the motion and the issue is preserved for reviewY5
The scope of appellate review is narrow. Rule 4-271 places wide discretion
in the hands of the administrative judge
in determining whether good cause exists to postpone a case. 11 Therefore, an
appellate court, as well as a trial judge,
may not reverse an administrative judge's
determination of good cause absent a
demonstration by the defendant of a
clear abuse of discretion or a lack of good
cause as a matter oflawY7
(The Law Forum-13
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Conclusion
In dealing with Rule 4-271, it is impor-

tant to remember that its purpose is to
promote orderly trial procedure. 118 In
keeping with this purpose, it is reasonable to conclude that the court will continue to rigidly adhere to the requirement
that only an administrative judge or his
or her designee may grant a postponement. Additionally, the court is likely to
continue its flexible approach when determining what constitutes good cause
and whether a defendant has sought or
expressly consented to a trial date in
violation ofthe Rule.
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